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一場堪比1929大蕭條的世界性危機正在醞釀

1971年8月15日,時任美國總統尼克松宣布,美元再次與黃金脫鉤,各國跟進,從此貨幣失去黃金之錨至今。

On August 15, 1971, then US President Richard Nixon announced that the us dollar was once again decoupled from gold, and other countries followed suit. Since then, the currency has lost its anchor of gold.

貨幣有三大功能,價值儲藏、度量尺度及交易媒介。

Money has three functions: a store of value, a measure, and a medium of exchange.

從此之後,價值貯藏功能消失,全面進入法幣時代。

From then on, the function of value storage disappeared and entered the era of legal currency.

如果說金本位下,貨幣發行速度跟不上經濟增速是經濟增長的制約。

If we say that under the gold standard, the fact that money supply can't keep up with economic growth is a constraint on economic growth.

那麼法幣時代下,印鈔速度總會超過經濟增速,沒有政府能管的住那只印鈔的手,信用的超速擴張也成為經濟增長的制約。

In the era of legal currency, the speed of money printing always exceeds the economic growth rate. No government can control the hand of money printing, and the overspeed expansion of credit has become the constraint of economic growth.

法幣時代,印鈔初期事實上是推進了經濟增長的,其推動了利率降低,使經濟潛力得以發揮。

In the era of fiat money, the initial stage of money printing actually promoted economic growth, which pushed down interest rates and gave full play to economic potential.

然而,隨著貨幣持續超發,凱恩斯的假設開始成為現實,當利率低至一定程度時,投機性對貨幣的需求暴增,所有新增的貨幣皆被吸納入投機體系,無論新增多少貨幣,也不會有資金進入實體體系。

However, as the money supply continues to overshoot, the Keynesian hypothesis becomes a reality. When interest rates are low enough, speculative demand for money explodes, and all the new money is absorbed into the speculative system. No matter how much money is added, no money will enter the real system.

金本位時代貨幣稍有多發即會被兌換成黃金,宏觀貨幣政策能量極小。

In the gold standard era, the currency would be converted into gold every time there was a slight increase in its value, and the macro monetary policy had very little power.

但法幣時代不同,宏觀貨幣政策能量極大,且多具有持續性,這給了投機者一個相當明確的信號,跟隨央行下場就必贏,刺激投機者下場參賭,購入金融資產。

However, different from the era of legal currency, the macro monetary policy is of great power and most of it is sustainable, which gives speculators a quite clear signal that they will win if they follow the central bank and stimulate them to take bets and buy financial assets in the end.

這應該已經超出了凱恩斯的設想,凱恩斯或者認為利率需低至一定程度才會激發流動性陷阱。

This should have gone beyond Keynes's assumption, or his belief that interest rates need to be low enough to trigger a liquidity trap.

而事實上,金融本就是賭預期的遊戲,由於宏觀寬鬆貨幣政策的明朗預期對投機者的鼓勵作用,在利率還比較高時,增量貨幣就已經全部被投機性需求吸收,進入金融資產,甚至不止是增量,投機性還會自實體搶奪存量貨幣,導致實體通縮。

As a matter of fact, it is the essence of financial bet expectations game, as a result of the macro monetary policy clear expectations for speculators to encourage, when interest rates are relatively high, the incremental currency is already all absorbed by speculative demand, into financial assets, even more than is incremental, speculative since the entity will take stock of money and in solid deflation.

全球包括中日在內的極多經濟體事實上已經陷入了流動性陷阱。

Many of the world's economies, including China's and Japan's, are effectively in a liquidity trap.

當存在流動性陷阱時,寬鬆救市政策預期越明朗,力度越強,越刺激資金流入金融資產進行投機,從而事實上減少實體資金量,抬高實體利率,扼殺經濟潛力。

When there is a liquidity trap, the more explicit the expectation of the easing policy is, the stronger the intensity will be, which will stimulate the capital flowing into financial assets for speculation, thus actually reducing the amount of real capital, raising the real interest rate and killing the economic potential.

實際結果是,實體越救越差。

The practical result is that the entity gets worse and worse.

目前,全球金融資產價格已頗有積重難返之勢,每當信用擴張導致金融風險時,無一例外,央行都會下場救市。

Global financial asset prices have become so entrenched that whenever credit expansion leads to financial risk, central Banks invariably bail them out.

從美國建國到2008年8月,200多年時間美國總共才印鈔8300億美元,然而,到了2014年9月,美聯儲的資產負債表規模已經高達4.5萬億美元。

From the founding of the United States to August 2008, it took more than 200 years for the United States to print a total of 830 billion dollars in money. However, by September 2014, the balance sheet of the federal reserve had reached 4.5 trillion dollars.

2013年1月,日本央行的資產規模還不到160萬億日元,2018年1月,這一數字就變成了546萬億日元。

The boj's assets were less than y160tn in January 2013 and y546bn in January 2018.

2008年1月,中國M2為41.78萬億, 2019年1月,M2已至186.59萬億。

In January 2008, China's M2 was 41.78 trillion yuan, and in January 2019, it reached 186.59 trillion yuan.

而對應的,則是資產價格暴漲,債務急劇擴張,美國股市、日本債市及中國房市,已成世界三大資產泡沫。

In contrast, asset prices have skyrocketed, debt has ballooned, and the U.S. stock market, Japanese bond market and Chinese housing market have become the world's three asset bubbles.

而日美國債、中國政府隱形債務都已成為潛在的風險點。

Japanese and us treasuries, as well as hidden Chinese government debt, have become potential risk points.

據CNBC稱,惠譽國際評級發布的全球政府債務圖表(Global Government Debt Chart Book)顯示,截至2018年,全球政府債務已經高達66萬億美元,大約是2007年的兩倍。

According to CNBC, the Global Government Debt Chart Book released by fitch ratings shows that Global Government Debt has reached $66 trillion as of 2018, roughly double the level in 2007.

由於世界性貨幣與信用的一再擴張,即算較低的利率也會催生大規模食利人群,使其退出生產型勞動,參與做蛋糕的人變少,驅使蛋糕變小,經濟衰退。

As the world currency and credit continue to expand, even lower interest rates will give rise to a large number of rentier people, who will withdraw from productive labor, and fewer people will be involved in making cakes, driving the cakes to become smaller and leading to economic recession.

很顯然,當利率具有空間時,可以通過降低利率,增加印鈔規模來刺激經濟增長,又不使食利階層分配增多(利率下降*貨幣規模擴大,一升一降),將問題拖延下去,但這又激勵了投機行為。

Obviously, when the interest rate has space, the economic growth can be stimulated by lowering the interest rate and increasing the scale of money printing without increasing the distribution of the rurious class (the interest rate decreases * the scale of money increases, rising and falling), which will delay the problem, but also stimulate the speculation.

但當利率已經降無可降時,任何增加印鈔的手段都是擴展食利階層分配,從而縮小蛋糕,驅使經濟衰退。

But when interest rates cannot be cut, any way to increase the printing press is to widen the distribution of the raking classes, thereby shrinking the pie and driving the economy into recession.

較為典型的是歐日利率已至極限,但貨幣寬鬆政策卻難以退出。

Typically, interest rates in Europe have reached their limit, but monetary easing is difficult to exit.

當再無手段拖延時,被吹漲至極限的信用規模將帶來一個深度危機,一個或許超越1929年大蕭條的危機……

When there is no further delay, the credit that has been blown to its limit will lead to a deep crisis, one that may surpass the great depression of 1929...


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